In this paper I explore how struggles around free speech between social movements and the state are often underpinned by a deeper struggle around expressive images of what counts as either 'decent' or 'indecent' discussion. These points are developed by exploring what is arguably the most famous populist place for free speech in Britain, namely Hyde Park. In 1872 the state introduced the Parks Regulation Act in order to regulate, amongst other things, populist uses of free speech at Hyde Park. However, although the 1872 Act designated a site in Hyde Park for public meetings, it did not mention 'free speech'. Rather the 1872 Act legally enforced the liberty to make a 'public address' and this was contrasted to the construction of an expressive image of 'indecent' speakers exercising their 'right' of free speech at Hyde Park. Once constructed the humiliating image of 'indecent' free speech could then be used by the state to regulate actual utterances of speakers. But the paper shows how in the years immediately following 1872 a battle was fought out in Hyde Park over the expressive image of public address between the state and regulars using Hyde Park as a public sphere to exercise free speech. For its part the state had to engage in meaningful deliberative forms of discussion within its own regulatory framework and with the public sphere at Hyde Park in order to maintain the legal form, content and expression of the 1872 Act. To draw out the implications of these points I employ some of the theoretical ideas of the Bakhtin Circle and Gilles Deleuze. Each set of thinkers in their own way make valuable contributions for understanding the relationship between the state, public sphere and expressive images.
Introduction
The public sphere has become in recent years an attractive way for many to think about how individuals activate a 'sense of ordinary and efficacious citizenship' (Eley 2002: 231) in society. In this regard, continues Eley:
The 'public sphere'…is a space between state and society in which political action occurs with real effectivities, whether in terms of the local effects, in building a sense of political agency, or in behaving ethically in one's social relations and allowing some notion of collective goods to be posed, and thereby contributing to the wider process of political mobilization (Eley 2002: 231) .
The public sphere, as a space in which strangers, comrades, friends and acquaintances can talk about issues of concern to themselves and the wider community, grants individuals the opportunity to reflect upon the world, their relationships with others in it and possible solutions to perceived ills.
An important attribute of the public sphere is that it can assume many different forms. There are global public spheres with a radical political agenda and associated with the likes of the anti-globalisation movement (see Cammaerts and Van Audenhove 2005; Chesters and Welsh 2006; Downey and Fenton 2003; Hardt and Negri 2004) , along with more policy orientated global public spheres dealing 3 with policy issues and associated with the likes of NGOs (see Chandler 2005; Ilcan and Lacey 2006 ). Yet there also exist local public spheres embedded in popular culture, styles and identities (Hartley and Green 2006) which are frequently related to everyday (new) media and associated with the likes of emotional populist public forums such as Reality TV (see Lunt and Stenner 2005; Terranova 2004; Virno 2004 ). There are of course other varieties of public spheres, not least those dealing with formal parliamentary politics (see Coleman 2005) , but what is noticeable in many accounts is the expressive, affectual, cultural and aesthetic sensibilities that the public sphere unleashes into political debate. Think for a moment of the way in which popular culture can actively engage people in political and social debate. For example television can create critical populist public spheres around expressive images such as charity telethon events like Red Nose Day in the UK which raises money and awareness for social causes in Africa and Britain. Or think about public spheres associated with the anti-globalisation movement. On many occasions antiglobalisation movements act through deeply expressive and symbolic forms of protest that help to create a carnivalesque atmosphere at many strategic sites of demonstration; the meeting of the World Trade Organization, Seattle, 1999, being perhaps the notable example (McGuigan 2005 ; see also Jones 2007) .
But while the various strands of debate about the role that expression plays in the public sphere is still ongoing there is at a present two areas that remain problematic in much of the relevant literature. First, when the expressive and symbolic characteristics of the public sphere are thought about this is often done so in relation to wider and more substantial social relationships operating within civil 4 society. This is because civil society is itself frequently theorised as a realm of freedom and autonomy in which individuals and groups can express their unique identities and ethical standpoints at some distance from what is perceived to be the coercive nature of the nation-state. Under this scenario the nation-state is conceptualised as a somewhat corrupt and spent political force that institutionalises 'purposive-instrumental' rationality based upon means-ends calculations. As a result the nation-state, and other 'systems' of social action like the economy, are said to fail to engage in meaningful discursive communicative relationships with expressive and affectual public spheres in civil society (Habermas 1987 ).
Yet when one empirically examines how the nation-state confronts the expressive activity of public spheres in civil society it soon becomes clear that far from proceeding upon 'instrumentally' rational lines the nation-state in fact regularly engages along the lines of meaningful, reflexive, expressive and 'communicative' action with those in civil society. Indeed the nation-state not only engages along 'communicative' lines of action with public spheres in civil society it also engages in meaningful and reflexive 'communicative' debate within its own mechanisms of power and authority about how best to regulate expressive public spheres outside of its boundaries. To think otherwise, to still insist that the nation-state primarily employs instrumental reason, wrongly implies that only public spheres in civil society can engage in expressive forms of debate.
By focusing upon a specific empirical example of a public sphere, that of Hyde Park, London, the paper will show how from 1872 a dialogic struggle was fought 5 out between the state and various social movements using this public space for debate and discussion. This seems a particularly apt example if for no other reason than the fact that Hyde Park has for many years been known as a populist public space to practice free speech in the UK (see Roberts 2001; . Indeed, as Cooper (2006) suggests, Hyde Park represents three public-speech metaphors: the right to enjoy unrestricted utterances; the right to participate freely in a marketplace of ideas; and the right to engage in serious and meaningful debate (Cooper 2006: 756-757) . However, free speech at Hyde Park is regulated by an Act of Parliament, the 1872 Parks Regulation Act, which also incorporates the Rules of Hyde Park. Subsequently the three public-speech metaphors that have grown up at Hyde Park are themselves subject to specific forms of regulation. Moreover, these regulatory forms have been created historically through expressive performative struggles between the state and groups using Hyde Park to exercise free speech.
Mediating these struggles was an underlying expressive struggle around 'decent' and 'indecent' images of free speech performances at Hyde Park. While the meaning of 'decency' is usually thought of as encapsulating 'civil', 'respectable' and 'norms' of behaviour, its meaning at Hyde Park was somewhat different.
During the late nineteenth century a new type of dialogue had arisen in Victorian England specifically related to 'indecent' and 'verminous' people inhabiting London's Royal Parks. Primary attached to middle-class fears about the desecration of the capital's green public spaces by the 'underclass', 'indecency' in this instance expressed an image of London's green landscapes being polluted by some of its more 'vulgar' and 'unhealthy' inhabitants. The in/decency dualism at 6 Hyde Park was therefore integrally related to everyday material objects associated with the Royal Parks such as the grass, trees, paths, recreational pursuits, and so on; material objects that were seen by some as being contaminated by others. It was this expression that the authorities drew upon when they passed the Parks Regulation Act in 1872 to regulate populist struggles around free speech at Hyde Park. After 1872, however, further performative events and struggles around free speech managed to separate the in/decency dualism from the form and content of the 1872 Act ensuring that the Act remained inconsistent in its application by the state. But such was the flexibility of the meaning of in/decency at Hyde Park that the state could re-order this expression in a manner that once again ensured the consistency of the 1872 Act. The paper suggests that to undertake this task successfully the state had no choice but to understand, reflect upon and engage in dialogue with the intentions and meanings of protestors at Hyde Park.
Second, if the critical points above have some truth about them then we require a new way of thinking about meaningful expressive images and dialogue between public spheres in civil society and that of the nation-state. While many accounts do look theoretically at how the nation-state regulates the public sphere this is often achieved through an explicit and implicit division between the 'instrumental' rationality of the nation-state and the expressive 'communicative' rationality of public spheres in civil society. To overcome this theoretical dualism it will be argued that communication is embodied in intense expressive aesthetic images that operate in a quasi-autonomous manner. Expressive images can also therefore be adopted by states and mechanisms of governance to define and give legal form to 7 right-claims like free speech during unique events in which contestation arises over the right-claim in question. Indeed, as we will see, right-claims like free speech are never meaningful in an a priori manner but rather only come to be defined in a meaningful sense through dialogic events. To make these theoretical observations the paper draws upon the work of Gilles Deleuze and the Bakhtin Circle 2 . Both set of thinkers in their own way provide fruitful avenues to construct an alternative theory of the public sphere and its relation to expression and images. To begin to think through these points the next section firstly, although briefly, explores some issues on the public sphere, culture and expressive images.
The Public Sphere and Intense Expression
The public sphere, as a space that elicits debate and discussion amongst strangers and acquaintances in society through flows of information, has itself been the object of much discussion (for surveys see Calhoun 1992; Crossley and Roberts 2004; Goode 2005; Hill and Montag 2001; Johnson 2006; McKee 2005) . Some have focused their attention upon the relationship between the public sphere, culture and expression. This is to be expected especially since the most prominent thinker of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas, observes that the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in western Europe was itself based within expressive and emotional forms like newsletters, diaries, letter writing, novels, newspapers and journals, many of which entertained and fostered critical opinions between 8 strangers (Habermas 1989) . Indeed it was through information gained in these expressive forms along with the cultivation of a particular individual critical rationality that encouraged (white male) strangers to meet in urban public spaces like coffeehouses and salons and engage in debate and discussion about matters of social and political importance.
But while Habermas's early work has proved immensely attractive for many as a way of thinking about the modern public sphere, culture and expression, others have remained critical of it. Negt and Kluge (1993) , for example, claim that
Habermas only ever highlights the expressive cultural sensibilities of the bourgeoisie in Structural Transformation. Negt and Kluge seek to go beyond Habermas in this respect through their term 'block of real life' (Negt and Kluge 1993: 22ff.) . Designating the space where production and cultural experience meet the 'block of real life' is a site of struggle between different groups over the control and regulation of communication, fantasy, intense images, and possibilities.
Accordingly, from this perspective, conflicts in the public sphere are frequently struggles around iconoclasm, or the struggle to control images about what can be discussed in civil society (Finnegan and Kang 2004) . For example, Asen (2002) notes that countless social situations and contexts are mediated through 'collective imagining' that often operate as taken-for-granted 'shared assumptions, values, perceptions, and beliefs for matters identified explicitly as topics of discussion' (Asen 2002: 351) . Many of these assumptions are popular images related to everyday beliefs such as 'family values' which can in turn be related to contested social policies like policy provision for teenage pregnancy. Active engagement 9 occurs in collective imaginings when 'participants in public discussions explicitly reflect on the rights, responsibilities, and obligations granted, entitled and owed to one another' (Asen 2002: 351) . As part of the process of active engagement participants draw upon past images and past narratives of rights and entitlements and the association of these rights with specific issues and groups in order to question and reinterpret those images and narratives in the present and perhaps project future images of how rights should operate and affect others (see also Minow 1987) . Rights, on this understanding, are not merely associated with how
we 'see' injustice. Rather, rights are part of a wider progression of visuality, of images and imaginings in everyday life, which can act as the social precondition for activating new right-claims (see Woodiwiss 2001) .
Obviously in his later work Habermas develops his ideas and in the process addresses some of the criticisms directed at Structural Transformation. In particular Habermas's use of the terms lifeworld and systems attempt to make more theoretical sense of 'economic as well as political interactions and dynamics at the heart of contemporary Western societies' (Crossley 2003: 290) in relation to everyday public communication. The lifeworld is the sphere through which individuals engage in 'communicative action' with one another through three distinct expressive realms: cultural reproduction (associated with culture), social integration (associated with society) and solidarity (associated with personality) (see Habermas 1987: 219-220) . Each of these expressive domains is informed by speech acts based upon three normative 'validity claims' through which individuals locked in disagreement can reach understanding, agreement and settlement.
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In contexts of communicative action, speech acts can always be rejected under…three aspects: the aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for his action in relation to a normative context…the truthfulness that the speaker claims for the expression of subjective experiences…finally, the truth that the speaker, with his utterance, claims for a statement… (Habermas 1984: 307) .
Systems on the other hand refer to those realms like the economy and the state directed by strategic, instrumental and utilitarian reason. Systems primarily serve to 'stabilize nonintended interconnections of actions by way of functionally intermeshing action consequences…' (Habermas 1987: 117) . On this understanding systems eschew rational-critical action in preference of means-ends calculations about how best to achieve a goal. Strategic action can also arise when one person confronts another and tries to 'achieve their ends by way of an orientation to and influence on the decisions of other actors' (Habermas 1984: 87) .
According to Dahlberg (2005 Thus there is no reason why debate and discussion through normative claims cannot be said to arise through aesthetic means like storytelling, narratives and populist styles of behaviour such as 'Mock Parliaments' in which excluded groups gain a political and public voice by expressive acts (see also Habermas 1996: 355) .
Be this as it may, while it is possible to argue that Habermas's later work relates expression more coherently with normative values in the public sphere than his earlier work this is not achieved without its own problems. In particular Habermas
insists that the form of the public sphere, 'the universal public appealed to in moral-practical claims about justice' (Dahlberg 2005: 112) , is directly related to its content -three validity claims of normative rightness, subjective truthfulness and the truth of statements. The form and content of the public sphere is in turn directly related to its expression: cultural reproduction, social integration and solidarity.
The unifying force that brings all of these elements together is that of authenticity, of the ability of individuals to utilise their rational-critical faculties, ensuring that normative expressions of subjectivity can be created without recourse to instrumental rationality (Sitton 2003: 105) . But it is highly questionable to conceptualise the public sphere in such a way. As we have seen, expressive narratives and images can obtain a degree of independence from their exercise in concrete interactions. Expressive images are thus points of struggle between public spheres in civil society and regulatory authorities like the state. As a result, and this is a detail often overlooked even in those accounts of the public sphere that take expressive images seriously, so-called 'systems' likewise operate along expressive 'communicative' lines of action. Far from being mediated by 'instrumental rationality', an approach which incidentally implies that what actors think within a 'system' is of no lasting relevance because an actor's motivations are simply tied up 'in an action that helps the organization function' (Sitton 1998: 75 ; see also Cook 2005) , 'systems' are perfectly capable of engaging in the richer, more reflexive and critically-based 'communicative' rationality both within (e.g.) departments in its own regulatory body and with (e.g.) forces in civil society. Thus we need an alternative set of theoretical ideas to develop these points that sets us free from previous theoretical dualisms (Roberts 2003) .
The work of the Bakhtin Circle and Gilles Deleuze provide such a set of ideas. But rather than simply develop their insights on the public sphere and expression at a theoretical level the paper will instead elaborate upon them, and demonstrate their usefulness, through an empirical example. The empirical example will focus upon free speech struggles at Hyde Park at the turn of the twentieth century. By drawing upon the ideas of the Bakhtin Circle and Deleuze, it will be argued that the state sought to regulate the form and content of free speech at Hyde Park by drawing upon a specific though contingent expressive image in order to contain populist utterances therein. Expressive speech performances and the meaningful 'communicative' dialogue it calls forth have then been practised by both a diverse array of individuals at Hyde Park and by the state seeking to regulate the utterances of these individuals. As a result there is little sense in separating dialogue between the two at Hyde Park into 'communicative' and 'instrumental' rationality. The example of Hyde Park is therefore also useful because it highlights the point that 13 'free speech' does not exist as a norm irrespective of its use but rather gains 'normative' purchase through its instantiation at expressive events of contestation and/or struggle. It was during such events at Hyde Park that 'free speech' was (re)defined through dialogue between contesting forces.
Hyde Park, Speech and the Expressive Intensities of the 1872 Act
From the twelfth century up until 1783 Hyde Park was the home of Tyburn hanging tree, the most notorious place of public execution in Britain, at which felons were allowed to give a 'last dying speech' (Sharpe 1985) . During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, however, 'last dying speeches' at Hyde Park became a place for public dialogue about diminishing customary rights against the growing imposition of capitalist social relations and the rule of private property (cf.
Linebaugh 1991). The repetitive nature of watching people dangle by their necks on the end of a rope for, in a large number of cases, petty crimes against private property, had installed a habit of using 'last dying speeches' to engage in highly expressive, emotional and sometimes riotous public dialogue about the perceived unjust nature of the law (Brooke and Brandon 2005; Gatrell 1994; McLynn 1991) . 
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In Victorian Britain the term 'public decency' was also associated with those who were considered to express 'public indecency', 'fecklessness' and 'immorality'.
And it was the 'great unwashed', those in poverty, who were said to possess these latter character traits (Johnson 1993) . Within public parks themselves 'decency' was motivated by middle class fears about public health in public spaces. Through rational recreation, however, especially sports, picnics and an interest in nature, it was believed that one could demarcate and protect themselves from 'unclean' and 'unhealthy' persons who roamed urban parks (Dreher 1993; 1997) . In many London's public parks decency was also to be maintained by ensuring that the 'indecent' did not spoil the surrounding 'clean' landscape. It was in this sense that in/decency was integrally bound up with material items and objects inhabiting the royal parks; objects like the grass, fresh air, solitude, recreation, flowers, ponds, and so on. But, as Deleuze reminds us, we can only ever encounter virtual expressions in the event of here and now, the world of the 'actual', ensuring that virtual expressions will never be experienced in all of their complete form. 'This is why virtual objects exist only as fragments of themselves: they are found only as lost; they exist only as recovered' (Deleuze 1994: 127) . One way in which expression changes is as it moves through different events and their associated unique objects and social relations (Deleuze 1989: 34) . Everyday language for example typically reveals In this instance the intensity of in/decency, while present in the various Rules of Hyde Park and underpinned by the 1872 Act, was also cast free from the 1872 Act.
Once formalised through law in/decency drifted, moved through, and was actualised in, a number of 'minor' objects at Hyde Park like speaking platforms.
Importantly such minor objects gained their own specific identity through the creative energies of particular performing events associated with speakers and regulars at Hyde Park rather than through the state and 1872 Act. If, as Volsohinov 21 says, speech performances are those typical or habitual actions 'of identifying oneself and of identifying one's position in society, and so on' (Voloshinov 1973: 19-20) , which also denote changing sensibilities, transitory alliances, shifting social status, breakdowns in roles and expectations that will be present with 'a certain typical kind of expression' during an event (Bakhtin 1986: 87 ; see also Bakhtin 1981: 312; Voloshinov 1973: 20) , then the actual event of using vehicles for platforms was a 'typical' moment for many to use speech performances to gain greater expressive political rights against those of the state. If this is the case then the 1872 Act represented the failure of the authorities to formalise and render consistent new political relations at this particular public space.
Certainly the Metropolitan Police thought the issue serious enough to make two suggestions to render consistent the form, content and expression of the 1872 Act.
First, a number of vehicles would be allowed to enter the Park to be used as platforms but they would have to pass through a designated road. Second, a new Rule could be enacted that officially regulated these makeshift platforms by granting the police supervisory powers over which vehicles could be classified as 'speaking platforms' (PRO: HO 45/9490/3239). The proposal for a new Rule is noteworthy for three main reasons. First, the intense expression bound up within indecent public address was now to be defined through a more specific regulatory form insofar that some governance mechanisms, in this case the Metropolitan Police, were to enjoy greater powers of discretion. In fact speakers soon had to obtain a certificate from the Metropolitan Police to get 'official permission' to take Finally, the example of vehicles being used as speaking platforms illustrates how the state found it difficult to anticipate the way in which free speech would be creatively applied by social movements at this public space. That is to say, the state could not invoke a (Habermasian) preconceived legal 'norm' about the right of free speech at this specific public space exactly because each free speech event at Hyde
Park was unique and thus creatively produced new questions about free speech that could not be solved within a preconceived legal norm. Free speech therefore enjoyed a sense of 'eventness' about its use at Hyde Park. This was so to the extent that the right-claim of free speech did not contain what Deleuze terms as prior 'ultimate or original solutions' for the actual exercise of free speech at Hyde Park but instead raised 'only problem-questions' (Deleuze 1994: 132) as to the legal modification of free speech in order to address its actual use at specific events (see 23 also Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16) . In other words, the events of free speech enabled the 'right' of 'free speech' to be subject to dialogue at Hyde Park (see Lefebvre 2000: 411) . Subsequently, as we will now see through other examples, it was specific events that went on to legally modify the 'right' of 'free speech' rather than 'free speech' acting as a universal means to justify free speech events. identity, struggling to retain a normative monologic consistency (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 300; 357; see also Deleuze 1994: 46) .
How Expressions of Indecency
Perhaps this should not come as too much of a surprise since Hyde Park was by this time an established public sphere that represented, to borrow a saying from Bakhtin, 'the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between…different socio-ideological groups in the present' (Bakhtin 1981: 291) . Accordingly the 'molecular' activity of speakers like French also folded over into 'heteroglossic' minor public spaces within the public sphere of Hyde Park itself; minor public spaces that became 'meeting-and contacting-points for heterogeneous people' (Bakhtin 1984: 128) in which stories, narratives, images and experiences could be Lawrence (2006) observes that by the 1920s some commentators and Conservative politicians began to criticise Labour Party public meetings for being the epitome of disorder, 'rowdyism' and unpatriotic feeling (Lawrence 2006: 197-9) . These figures of authority were, amongst other things, alarmed by what they perceived to be a decline in deference since 1918 from the newly enfranchised 'ruffian' elements of the electorate. It was thought by some that this 'unruly rabble ', 32 associated not only with the Labour Party but also with Suffragette and other types of popular politics, no longer seemed willing to revere their 'social superiors' and were also increasingly ready to condemn Britain's imperialist greatness. This is a particularly important point because, as Hobsbawn (1987) notes, in post-1873
imperialist Britain a new type of public symbolism, loyalty and obedience from the nation towards authority was now to be captured through 'old and tired evokers of emotion such as the crown and military glory' (Hobsbawn 1987: 105) . The Union Jack was such one expression of monologic dialogue associated with the power of imperialist state. Through his heteroglossic performance of 'free speech', however, Aldred associated the Union Jack with an imperialist identity that bred poverty and ignorance. Accordingly free speech was called upon at this event to both critically interrogate these nationalist expressions and the sense of free speech at Hyde Park.
But according to the police report Aldred's utterances provoked hostility from some audience members and were said to contain 'blasphemous words' that had 
Conclusion
This paper has been concerned to show how free speech at Hyde Park had the appearance of being open to all but, in reality, was a moment of different interlocking intense and virtual images operating within the form and content of the 1872 Act. At Hyde Park it was undoubtedly the case that a public sphere and public space became legally sanctioned in London that enabled individuals to engage in public deliberation. However even though a public sphere was present, free speech did not enjoy any legal legitimacy. Undoubtedly both public address and free speech folded into one another within the same social space, but both also had unique expressive meanings and themes attached to them. One way in which 34 the state sought to maintain a monologic consistency during this period was to ensure that the virtual image of 'indecent' speech associated with the 1872 Act remained consistent. It accomplished this through a rich, meaningful and reflexive type of debate and discussion within its own regulatory framework. Yet due to the emerging and different events of speech performances at Hyde Park the form, content and expression the 1872 Act constantly broke down at different temporal and spatial points as the binary opposition of in/decency was challenged. At these points the regulatory intense power of 'public address' was rendered consistent by the state through other available Acts and through new intense expressions and images.
